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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Moses Richard Delarosa appeals from the judgment entered upon a jury 
verdict finding him guilty of possession of methamphetamine. Delarosa contends 
the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Officers Chad Benson and Tyler Gray were dispatched to a report of a 
fight in progress. (10/8/2013 Tr., p.124, Ls.16-22, p.134, Ls.12-14.) When the 
officers arrived, they did not find anyone fighting; however, as part of their 
investigation they knocked on the door of Delarosa's trailer because it matched 
the description of the location where the fight reportedly occurred. (10/8/2013 
Tr., p.125, Ls.12-25.) A female answered the door and said she "knew nothing 
about a fight" and initially claimed she was home alone with her two children. 
(10/8/2013 Tr., p.126, Ls.1-15.) This claim ultimately proved untrue and a "male 
subject came to the door" and identified himself as Jose Ortega. (10/8/2013 Tr., 
p.127, Ls.3-6.) This also proved untrue and officers ultimately learned that the 
individual was Delarosa. (10/8/2013 Tr., p.127, L.24 - p.128, L.15.) Officer 
Benson arrested Delarosa for providing false information. (10/8/2013 Tr., p.128, 
Ls.16-19.) 
During intake at the jail, Deputy Thomas Sessions located a "cylindrical 
pipe or tube" in Delarosa's back pocket. (10/8/2013 Tr., p.160, L.21 - p.160, 
L.13; see also p.129, L.13 - p.130, L.5.) There was a "white powdery substance 
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inside the tube," which tested positive for methamphetamine. (10/8/2013 Tr., 
p.130, L.11-p.131, L.15; p.193, Ls.1-8.) 
The state charged Delarosa with possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of paraphernalia 1 and the case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.10-11, 20-
22.) During trial, Delarosa requested a mistrial after Deputy Sessions testified 
that, when he asked Delarosa about the tube in his pocket, Delarosa said "he 
had picked it up on his way out of the house that day." (10/8/2013 Tr., p.160, 
Ls.18-21.) The basis for Delarosa's request was that Deputy Sessions' report did 
not reflect that Delarosa made any statement and the officers' reports did not 
indicate whether Delarosa was ever read Miranda2 warnings. (10/8/2013 Tr., 
p.164, Ls.11-22.) The court denied Delarosa's request for a mistrial, but 
instructed the jury to disregard Deputy Sessions' testimony about Delarosa's 
statement "based on lack of any proof of Miranda warnings." (10/8/2013 Tr., 
p.166, Ls.20-24 (ruling on motion); p.170, Ls.11-18 (curative instruction).) 
While the jury was deliberating, it sent the following written question to the 
court: "Was there any testimony on how the tube got into the defendant's 
pocket? Specifically, is there written testimony to which we can refer?" (R., 
p.123.) With the consent of the parties, the court responded: 
It is for the jury using their [sic] collective recollection, to 
determine what the testimony was. I have instructed you as to 
what evidence you may consider and I have also instructed you as 
to what evidence you may not consider. 
1 The state also charged Delarosa with providing false information; Delarosa pied 
guilty to this charge prior to trial. (10/8/2013 Tr., p.1, Ls.14-18, p.99, L.3 - p.105, 
L.20.) 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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You have with you in the jury room State's Exhibit 2.[3] That 
is the only exhibit that was admitted at trial. If you are asking about 
a transcript of the testimony I would advise you that there is no 
transcript of the testimony. I could have the court reporter read 
back a portion of the testimony if you can sufficiently narrow or 
identify the portion you are interested in hearing. We would have to 
have Ms. Saunders who was the court reporter yesterday come in, 
which could certainly be done, if your area of interest concerns 
testimony from yesterday. 
(R., p.124; 10/9/2013Tr., p.49, L.25-p.51, L.6.) 
The jury found Delarosa guilty of possessing methamphetamine but 
acquitted him of possessing paraphernalia. (R., pp.10-11, 20-21, 90-91; 
10/9/2013 Tr., p.52, L.17 - p.53, L.2.) The court imposed a unified five-year 
sentence with three years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.158-160.) 
Delarosa timely appealed. (R., pp.151-154.) 
3 Exhibit 2 was the tube located in Delarosa's pocket that tested positive for 
methamphetamine. (10/9/2013 Tr., p.9, L.24 - p.13, L.21.) 
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ISSUE 
Delarosa states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by failing to declare a mistrial after the jury 
heard testimony by Deputy Sessions that Mr. Delarosa had made 
statements regarding his possession of the grey tube in which 
methamphetamine residue had been found? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Delarosa failed to establish he was entitled to a mistrial based on 
testimony the district court instructed the jury not to consider? 
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ARGUMENT 
Delarosa Has Failed To Establish He Was Entitled To A Mistrial Based Upon 
Testimony That The District Court Instructed The Jury Not To Consider 
A. Introduction 
Delarosa challenges the denial of his motion for mistrial, claiming the 
motion should have been granted because "there is a great danger that the jury 
did not disregard the stricken testimony" but instead "considered it to [his] 
detriment." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Delarosa's claim fails because it is based on 
a presumption that the jury ignored the district court's instruction not to consider 
certain testimony even though the law presumes the opposite. Even if the jury 
considered Deputy Sessions' stricken testimony, the evidence that Delarosa 
claimed he picked up the paraphernalia on his way out of the house was 
harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review applicable to the refusal of a trial court to grant a 
mistrial upon a motion in a criminal case is well established: 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the 
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether 
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented 
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, 
where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the 
'abuse of discretion' standard is a misnomer. The standard, more 
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. [The appellate court's] 
focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that 
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a 
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, 
constituted reversible error. 
5 
State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 
1983)). Because the right to due process guarantees only a fair trial, not an 
error-free one, "error is not reversible unless it is shown to be prejudicial." 
Grantham, 146 Idaho at 498, 198 P.3d at 136 (citing State v. Shepherd, 124 
Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993)). "Error will be deemed 
harmless if the appellate court is able to declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of 
contributed to the conviction." Shepherd, 124 Idaho at 58, 855 P.2d at 895 
(citations omitted). 
C. Delarosa Has Failed To Overcome The Presumption That The Jury 
Followed The District Court's Instruction Not To Consider Deputy 
Sessions' Challenged Testimony 
Delarosa asserts the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion for mistrial because, he believes, the jury may have ignored the court's 
instruction to disregard Deputy Sessions' testimony that Delarosa told him he 
picked up the paraphernalia on his way out of the house. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.5-8.) This argument ignores that the law presumes otherwise. "Where 
improper testimony is inadvertently introduced into a trial and the trial court 
promptly instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, it is ordinarily presumed 
that the jury obeyed the court's instruction entirely." Grantham, 146 Idaho at 498, 
198 P.3d at 136 (citation omitted). Thus, the Court will "normally presume that a 
jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently 
presented to it, unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be 
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unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of 
the evidence would be devastating to the defendant." lg_,. 
Delarosa attempts to overcome the presumption that the jury followed the 
court's instruction not to consider Deputy Sessions' testimony by relying on the 
jury's question about whether there was "any testimony on how the tube got into 
the defendant's pocket." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) According to Delarosa, "despite 
the jury's best effort to follow instructions, they [sic], at a minimum, discussed the 
stricken testimony during deliberation trying to determine whether or not such 
evidence could be considered and, at worst, considered the stricken testimony in 
determining the guilty verdict." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) The jury's question does 
not support Delarosa's argument. The jury's question does not reflect that it 
discussed the stricken testimony but was confused about whether it could be 
considered; it reflects precisely what it says - that the jury did not recall whether 
there was "any testimony on how the tube got into [Delarosa's] pocket." (R., 
p.123.) Further, the court's response reminded the jury that it had instructed the 
jury "as to what evidence [it] may consider" and "what evidence [it] may not 
consider." (R., p.124.) Thus, even if the jury recalled Deputy Sessions' 
challenged testimony, it is presumed it recalled the court's instruction not to 
consider it. Delarosa's claim that the jury may have done otherwise is insufficient 
to meet his burden of showing an "overwhelming probability" that the jury was 
unable to follow the court's instruction. 
Even if the jury "discussed the stricken testimony," as Delarosa suggests, 
the evidence was hardly "devastating." The jury acquitted Delarosa of the 
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paraphernalia charge and only found him guilty of possessing 
methamphetamine. Without testimony regarding Delarosa's statement to Deputy 
Sessions, the state presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find 
Delarosa possessed methamphetamine. Delarosa's statement to Deputy 
Sessions that he picked up the tube that contained the methamphetamine "on his 
way out of the house that day" did not show that Delarosa knew the tube 
contained methamphetamine nor did it contradict his assertion, in closing 
argument, that he did not know what was in the tube. (See 10/9/2013 Tr., p.39, 
L.2 - p.40, L.17.) As such, the testimony that formed the basis for Delarosa's 
motion for mistrial was not the sort of "devastating" evidence that requires a 
mistrial. 
Because Delarosa has failed to meet his burden of establishing the district 
court erred in denying his motion for mistrial, he is not entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Delarosa's conviction. 
DATED this 26th day of January 2015. 
JES~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of January 2015, I served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defenders' basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
JML/pm 
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